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Abstract
A moving-violation traffic stop is pretextual when it is motivated by suspicion of an
unrelated crime. Despite concerns that they infringe on civil liberties and enable dis-
crimination against minority motorists; evidence on the use, frequency, and nature of
pretextual stops is mostly anecdotal. Using nearly a decade’s worth of traffic citation
data from Louisville, KY, I find evidence suggesting that pretextual stops predicated
on a particular moving violation—failure to signal—were relatively frequent. Com-
pared to stops involving other similarly common moving violations, where arrest rates
range from 0.01 to 0.09, stops involving failure-to-signal yield an arrest rate of 0.42.
More importantly, pretext to stop a vehicle requires only one traffic violation. In stops
involving failure-to-signal, the arrest rate is 0.52 when no other traffic violations are
cited, and the presence of other traffic violations yields a 55% relative decrease in the
probability of arrest. Relative to conventional traffic stops, black and Hispanic mo-
torists account for a disproportionate share of likely pretextual stops. Yet, within likely
pretextual stops, they are arrested at a significantly lower rate than other motorists.
Following departmental adoption of body-worn cameras (body cams) I find that the
arrest rate in likely pretextual stops increases 33-34%, and the racial disparity in the
arrest rate becomes much smaller and statistically insignificant.
Preliminary draft: comments welcome.
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1 Introduction
In early February 2019, body-cam video from a Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD)
traffic stop was posted to YouTube. By early April, the video had been viewed more than
one-million times and sparked discussion in the city over perceptions of racial bias in polic-
ing. The motorist in the video—an 18-year-old black male—is stopped for making a wide
turn. He is directed to exit the car and is frisked. When asked, he declines consent to a ve-
hicle search. A police dog then inspects the outside of the vehicle which the officers contend
alerts them to the presence of contraband. The motorist is placed in handcuffs, the vehicle
is searched, and no contraband is ultimately found. On April 11, the editorial board of the
Louisville Courier-Journal offered the incident as an example of a pretextual traffic stop: a
moving-violation traffic stop motivated by suspicion of a crime unrelated to the violation.1
That is, the traffic violation is used as pretext to conduct what would otherwise be consid-
ered an investigatory traffic stop.
Absent a traffic violation, police are permitted to conduct investigatory traffic stops un-
der reasonable suspicion of a crime. For traffic stops, the standard of reasonable suspicion—
stemming from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)—requires specific and articulable facts to
suggest that criminal activity is afoot. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the
US Supreme Court upheld pretextual traffic stops as constitutional in a unanimous deci-
sion. In the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that the “temporary detention of a motorist upon
probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would
not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.”
Following theWhren decision, pretextual stops elicited wide discussion among legal schol-
ars, with potential racial bias in their use being a common concern.2 Yet to date, evidence
1The video is found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CCQv-i6UBI; the article,
here: https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2019/04/11/louisville-police-traffic-
stops-harassing-west-end-editorial/3429651002/.
2Among others, see: Davis (1996), Harris (1996), Hecker (1996), O’Day (1997), or Sklansky (1997).
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regarding the frequency and nature of pretextual stops is mostly anecdotal. This dearth of
empirical evidence is understandable. The reasoning behind any particular stop is known
only to the officer making it; and police departments have no incentive to share whether or
how they use pretextual stops. Using citation data from traffic stops in Louisville, KY, that
span January 2010 to August 2019; I show that despite the difficulty of identifying pretex-
tual stops on a case-by-case basis, their use in the aggregate can potentially be detected by
understanding the distinct motive underlying them.
Conventional and pretextual traffic stops stem from distinctly different motives. The
former are motivated by enforcement of traffic laws; the latter, by investigating suspicion of
an unrelated crime. This defining motive will generate two distinct features of pretextual
stops. First, given sufficient variation in the rates at which different moving violations are
committed, pretextual stops will concentrate around a particular moving violation or rela-
tively small group. In conventional traffic stops, citation rates of different moving violations
partly reflect the rates at which: motorists commit different violations, different commit-
ted violations are detected, and different detected violations are cited.3 In pretextual stops
however, because suspected motorists will be stopped as soon as they commit any traffic
violation, concentration will occur around the violation(s) committed most often. Second,
in conventional stops, arrest occurs following a successful search, but searches only occur if
the officer develops suspicion during the post-stop interaction with the driver. In pretextual
stops, suspicion exists before a traffic violation is committed. If those suspicions are even
slightly well-founded, pretextual stops should yield a higher arrest rate than conventional
traffic stops.
Given these two features, if pretextual stops are sufficiently frequent, a moving violation
on which they are often predicated should carry a higher arrest rate than other moving
violations. Yet, under a null hypothesis of no pretextual stops, an unusually high arrest
3Stops are costly and violations vary in the danger they pose and fines they carry. With an objective
of promoting public safety, generating revenue (see e.g., Garrett and Wagner, 2009), or some combination;
optimal policing likely involves stopping and citing different violations at different rates.
2
rate given a particular moving violation might stem from correlation between propensity
to commit it, and criminality. Exploiting the unique motive underlying pretextual stops, I
condition arrest rate on the presence of other traffic violations as a test of this hypothesis. If
a high arrest rate given a particular violation is due to correlation between criminality and
propensity to commit the violation; then the arrest rate should remain high when additional
traffic violations are cited. Alternatively, a significant decrease in arrest rate conditional
on the presence of other traffic violations would suggest the practice of pretextual stops,
which—aimed at investigating suspicion of a crime—will be made as soon as any traffic vi-
olation is committed. This is because pretext for a stop requires only one traffic violation.4
Within the sample of Louisville traffic citations, I find evidence suggesting that a partic-
ular moving violation—failure to signal—was frequently used as a basis for pretextual stops.
Among the sample’s four most commonly cited objective moving violations, stopped drivers
were arrested at rates of: 0.009 when cited for speeding, 0.067 when cited for disregarding a
traffic light, 0.086 when cited for disregarding a stop sign, and 0.416 when cited for failure
to signal.5 Following stops where failure-to-signal is the only cited traffic violation, arrest
occurs at a rate of 0.522. Controlling for several stop-specific factors, the presence of other
traffic violations reduces the arrest rate by 0.287, a 54.98 percent relative decrease. This
pattern also holds across each of the eight geographically-defined LMPD patrol districts. Per
week, likely pretextual stops occurred 11.5 times and yielded 6.7 arrests on average.
Using these likely pretextual stops, I then add to a growing economic literature examin-
ing racial disparities in the US criminal-justice system.6 In testing for racial bias, pretextual
stops offer appealing features. First, because they are made prior to a face-to-face interaction
4For example, a pretextual stop can be ruled out if a driver is cited for both a moving violation and a
faulty tail light, because a faulty tail light alone provides pretext to stop the motorist. A pretextual stop of
the driver would have occurred before any moving violation were committed.
5Arrest rates are out of 213,693, 19,283, 15,341, and 8,641 traffic stops respectively, and exclude traffic
stops that resulted in charges for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
6See for instance: Arnold et al. (2018) on bail decisions; Fryer (2019) or Hoekstra and Sloan (2020) on
police use of force; West (2018) on police investigations; Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) or Horrace and Rohlin
(2016) on traffic stop decisions; Goncalves and Mello (2017) on traffic-violation reporting; and Knowles et al.
(2001), Anwar and Fang (2006), Antonovics and Knight (2009), or Ritter (2017) on search decisions following
traffic stops.
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with the driver, pretextual-stop decisions are based on a relatively limited amount of infor-
mation. Compared to search decisions following conventional traffic stops, race is typically
one of a much smaller set of factors which are observable at the time of pretextual-stop deci-
sions.7 Second, because they are essentially marginal investigatory stops, the Becker (1957)
outcome test, comparing success (arrest) rates among marginal searches of different groups—
which should be equal, absent discrimination—will partially overcome the infra-marginality
problem when applied to pretextual-stop decisions.8 Beyond these appealing features, I ex-
ploit the LMPD’s adoption and gradual deployment of body-worn cameras (body cams) from
June 2015 to March 2016, to further circumvent the infra-marginality problem.
Among marginal pretextual stops, if the arrest rate is lower for minority motorists, it
suggests a lower threshold was exercised against them when initiating these stops, revealing
racial bias. Police are permitted to conduct pretextual stops, but they are not supposed to
use race as a factor in deciding whether to conduct them. Body cams heighten accountability
and increase the cost to officers of using race-dependent thresholds in such a manner. Prior
to body-cam adoption, if—despite race-neutral thresholds—racial disparities in pretextual-
stop arrest rates arise due to infra-marginality, then these disparities should persist afterward
because body cams don’t affect the cost of such practices. However, if initial disparities arise
from race-dependent pretextual-stop thresholds, these disparities may decrease with body
cams in use.
Prior to the adoption of body cams, while representing only 29.20 percent of conventional
traffic stops, black and Hispanic motorists account for 49.33 percent of likely pretextual stops.
Yet, compared to other motorists, their arrest rate following likely pretextual stops is sig-
nificantly lower. Controlling for numerous stop-specific factors, the pretextual-stop arrest
rate for black and Hispanic motorists prior to body-cam adoption is 17.72 percent lower rel-
7As such, pretextual stops may be especially prone to bias stemming from race-specific errors in judging
the probability of a crime; what Bohren et al. (2019) term inaccurate statistical discrimination.
8Typically, the infra-marginality problem arises because researchers only observe average search-success
rates and lack sufficient information to identify the marginal searches. If the probability of carrying contra-
band is distributed differently across races, average success rates by group may differ even if a race-neutral
search threshold is applied. See Ayres (2002) for a thorough discussion.
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ative to all other motorists, and 19.06 percent lower relative to non-Hispanic whites. When
restricting analysis to periods of daylight—when driver race is more easily observed—these
disparities are even larger.
Following body-cam deployment, likely pretextual stops were conducted at a slightly
lower frequency, but body cams appear to have little effect on this. However, consistent
with use of a higher threshold in general, I find that body-cam adoption explains a 33 to 34
percent relative increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate overall: with a 41.2 to 43.9 percent
relative increase among black and Hispanic motorists, and a 25.7 to 27.6 percent relative
increase among all other motorists. After accounting for the effect of body cams, the dispar-
ity in pretextual-stop arrest rate between black-or-Hispanic and other motorists, becomes
small and statistically insignificant. These results challenge the notion that pre-adoption
disparities in arrest rate resulted from infra-marginality. Rather, they are more consistent
with racially-biased use of pretextual stops before body-cam deployment, and more careful
and race-neutral use thereafter.
2 Data
Data come from the Uniform Citation dataset provided on the Louisville Open Data portal.9
The dataset covers all uniform citations issued by the LMPD, and my sample spans January
1, 2010 to August 19, 2019. The data record an issued citation’s date, time, and location
(typically intersection or street block). Also recorded are the police division and beat in
which citations were issued, the age, race, ethnicity, and gender of the cited individual, as
well as all charges that were pressed against the individual as part of the stop.
The citations included in the raw data are not exclusively from traffic stops. How-
ever, I am able to identify citations stemming from traffic stops using text descriptions of
charges, violated statutes, and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) codes. I identify 495,933
citations for traffic-related charges stemming from 448,922 traffic stops. The LMPD has
9See Louisville Metro Government (2019).
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eight geographically-defined patrol divisions that accounted for 469,705 of the traffic-related
citations and 425,169 of the traffic stops. Figure 1 provides a map of the coverage areas
for these patrol divisions. The division codes reported for the remaining 5,967 stops sug-
gest that they were made across nine different specialty units. Empirical assessments will
focus on stops made by the eight major patrol divisions. The LMPD has a “mobile” (not
geographically defined) ninth division which focuses on illegal weapons. It should be noted
that it was the ninth division that conducted the controversial stop referenced in the opening
paragraph. Stops conducted by the ninth division are not reported in the data however.
Among traffic citations, I group similar charges to identify 19 common violations.10 Of
the 469,705 traffic citations issued, 465,080 belong to one of these common traffic violations.
The remaining 4,625 citations involve traffic-related charges that are issued relatively infre-
quently.
Among these 19 common traffic violations, I distinguish between three types: objective
driving violations, subjective driving violations, and non-driving violations. Whereas driving
violations are based on how a vehicle is operated (e.g. speeding or disregarding a stop sign),
non-driving violations are charges unrelated to the manner in which the motorist drives (e.g.,
driving with an expired license plate or with a defective brake light). That is, non-driving
violations are break statutes that a motorist and their vehicle must comply with before tak-
ing to the road.
I define objective driving violations as those whose commission can be established with-
out the exercise of judgment. For example, failure-to-signal is committed any time a driver
changes lanes without first signaling his intent. The signal is either given, or it isn’t. Con-
versely, subjective driving violations are those whose commission depends on the judgment
of the officer. For instance, the Kentucky statute against following-too-close reads that the
“operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable
10Some of these 19 traffic violations encompass multiple different charges. For instance, I characterize
speeding in general here as one traffic violation, although in Louisville, distinct charges are issued for each
mile-per-hour over the speed limit a motorist drove.
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and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicle and the traffic upon and condition
of the highway.” This violation can’t be established without judging what is reasonable and
prudent.
Table 1 reports the frequency with which each of the 19 traffic violations were cited, as
well as the percentage of traffic stops in which each violation was cited. Among objective
driving violations, notice that speeding, disregarding a traffic light, disregarding a stop sign,
and failure to signal are cited far more frequently than any others. In light of this clear
cutoff, testing for the presence of pretextual stops will focus on these four most common
objective driving violations.
3 LMPD Adoption of Body-worn Cameras
I gather information on the process by which body-worn cameras were adopted and deployed
among Louisville police from Schaefer et al. (2017), a report prepared for the LMPD one
year after the body-cam deployment. The LMPD began researching the possibility of body
cams in 2012 based on a sense that major police departments in the US were trending
toward their adoption. The perceived benefits were that they would increase transparency
and thereby improve community relations, but also support officers by providing records
of civilian contacts. It should be noted that the initial interest in body cams, the eventual
decision to adopt them, and the timing of their deployment, do not appear to be particularly
related to the practice pretextual stops.
Following the initial exploratory research period, body cams were not adopted due to
budgetary constraints. At issue was not the fixed costs of the equipment—which the report
approximates to be $800 per camera—but rather the data-storage costs involved. In addition
to these costs, community interest in body cams at that time was reportedly “mild”. This
changed sharply however in the summer of 2014 when national attention was drawn to the
officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. According to Schaefer
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et al. (2017), budgetary provisions for LMPD body cams and video storage were made
soon after that incident. It is especially notable that the impetus for body-cam adoption
was a highly publicized incident in another city and state. Thus, the timing of body-cam
deployment across the LMPD appears plausibly exogenous to concurrent police practices
within Louisville.
The LMPD then established policies on the use of body cams. Officers wear body cams
on their heads or uniform collars, and are required to record “all law enforcement related
activities”; which encompasses all calls for service and any time an enforcement action (such
as a traffic stop) is taken. Officers must upload all video to a cloud-based storage system
either at the end of a shift or the beginning of their next shift. Except in cases of crimes
where the State’s evidence requirements mandate longer, all videos are stored for 30 days.
Officers’ supervisors are required review video of all critical incidents, use-of-force incidents,
and civilian complaints.
The deployment of body cams within the LMPD was staggered at the partol-division
level. The department deemed it prudent to initially have a single pilot division use the
body cams as a means of trouble-shooting potential unanticipated complications. According
to Schaefer et al. (2017), the “Fifth Division was chosen for the pilot study because it is a
moderately active division and command staff felt that if there was a failure in the camera
deployment it would not result in the program being killed across the department.” The
concern seemed to be that if it were introduced in a highly active patrol division, those
officers might view the changes as more of an inconvenience, and word-of-mouth might lead
to the program losing officer support department-wide.
After the pilot study, the department began deploying body cams in a staggered manner
one division at a time. Anticipating an initial learning process in working with the body
cams, the department chose to stagger deployment so as to avoid requests for assistance
and unexpected challenges from coinciding department-wide. Following the Fifth Division,
the ordering of deployment was partly focused on patrol areas known for lower income and
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relatively higher crime. Table 2 presents the body-cam deployment dates for each of the
LMPD patrol divisions.
Note that body cams were not deployed in the sixth division until March 11, 2016. All
other patrol divisions had body cams deployed from June 1 through October 2 of 2015. This
was due to connectivity issues. During the deployment phase, it was determined that the
sixth division would require the installation of new fiber-optic cables, hence the delay of more
than five months. This delay proves empirically advantageous as, from October 2, 2015 to
March 10, 2016, the sixth patrol division provides a control group for the other divisions to
be compared against.
4 Detecting the Use of Pretextual Stops
My empirical work has two general components. Initially, among traffic stops involving the
most common objective driving violations, I use post-stop arrest rates to test for the use
of pretextual stops, as well as identify and characterize stops that were likely pretextual.
Then, I examine racial disparities in the use of likely pretextual stops, and assess how these
disparities were affected by the adoption and deployment of body cams. Here, I discuss the
methodology used to test for the use of pretextual stops, present these initial results, and
then characterize the frequency of pretextual stops, and heterogeneity in their use across
LMPD patrol division. Empirical considerations and results related to racial disparities in
pretextual stops are presented in Section 5.
4.1 Methodology
The unique motive underlying pretextual stops suggests that they should concentrate among
a particular traffic violation (or small group) and yield a higher post-stop arrest rate than
conventional (non-pretextual traffic stops). I exclude traffic stops resulting in any charges
for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) because suspicion of this particular
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crime does relate to common driving violations. Intoxicated drivers presumably are more
likely to speed, disregard traffic signals, and fail to signal turns or lane changes. The notion
of a pretextual stop is that it is motivated by suspicion of a crime that is unrelated to the
driving violation being cited.
Among the common traffic violations that were present in at least 2 percent of all stops,
Table A1 of the Appendix reports arrest rates following stops including citations for these
violations. The arrest rate of 0.4158 following failure-to-signal seems remarkably high just
given the nature of the violation. It seems especially high when compared to the arrests rates
following other common objective driving violations which range from 0.0087 to 0.0859. It is
even more than double the arrest rate conditional on reckless driving, a violation that more
plausibly relates to suspicion of other crimes.
Frequent use as the basis for pretextual stops would explain the high arrest rate con-
ditional on failure-to-signal. However, if criminality strongly correlates with propensity to
commit failure-to-signal (but not other objective driving violations), then this unusually high
arrest rate could occur under a null hypothesis of no pretextual traffic stops. To test this
hypothesis, I estimate the following equation with the sample restricted to traffic stops in
which failure-to-signal was cited:
Arresti = α1Multiplei +Xi
′
θ + ǫi. (1)
Arresti is a binary indicator equal to 1 if traffic stop i resulted in an arrest, and equal to
zero otherwise. Multiplei is a binary indicator equal to 1 if more than one traffic violation
was cited in stop i, and equal to zero otherwise. If the high arrest given failure to signal
is due to correlation between criminality and propensity to commit the violation, then on
average, the arrest rate should be high any time failure-to-signal is cited. The presence of
other traffic violations should have no effect on arrest rate, or if anything, increase it. Thus,
under the null hypothesis, α1 ≥ 0.
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Alternatively, if the presence of other traffic violations causes a significant decrease in
arrest rate, it suggests that failure-to-signal was frequently used as the basis for pretextual
stops. Because they are motivated by investigating suspicion of an unrelated crime, pretex-
tual stops will be made as soon as a violation is committed. That is, pretextual stops won’t
include multiple traffic violations, because just one violation provides sufficient pretext to
stop the vehicle. Among the 8,641 stops in the estimation sample involving failure-to-signal,
2,885 involved more than one traffic violation. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the fre-
quency and percent frequency at which other traffic violations were cited within those stops.
Table A1 reports simple differences in means between stops in which multiple traffic vio-
lations were cited, and stops in which only one traffic violation was cited. Column (1) reports
this estimate from stops including failure to signal. For comparison, similar estimates from
stops including speeding, disregarding a traffic light, and disregarding a stop sign are re-
ported in columns (2), (3), and (4), respectively. Absent any other controls, relative to when
failure-to-signal is the only traffic violation cited, the presence of other traffic violations re-
sults in a statistically significant 60.8 percent decrease in arrest rate. Conversely, in columns
(2) through (4), the presence of other traffic violations increases arrest rate, as would be
expected under the null hypothesis. Because these simple estimates may omit factors that
influence both the presence of multiple violations and probability of arrest, the vector Xi
contains fixed effects for the LMPD division conducting the stop, as well as the hour of the
day, day of the week, month of the year, and year in which the traffic stop occurred.
4.2 Results
Table 4 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) under the full spec-
ification.11 The estimate in column (1) comes from stops including failure to signal, and
estimates in columns (2), (3), and (4) are from stops including other common driving vio-
lations for the purposes of comparison. In column (1), the coefficient on Multiple strongly
11Robust standard errors are clustered at the division-by-year level.
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rejects the null hypothesis of no pretextual stops. Relative to a predicted arrest rate of 0.5217
when failure-to-signal is the only traffic violation cited, the presence of multiple violations
generates a 55.01 percent decrease in the arrest rate. In columns (2), (3), and (4) however,
the presence of multiple traffic violations increases the arrest rate (if anything), as would be
expected from conventional traffic stops.
Restricting attention to stops involving failure-to-signal, Table A3 in the Appendix re-
ports estimates of equation (1) under an alternative specification where division fixed effects
are replace with division-by-beat fixed effects. These estimates are similar in sign, signifi-
cance, and magnitude to those under the specification from Table 4.
The editorial referenced in the opening paragraph suggested that pretextual stops were
not especially common on Louisville’s more affluent east end. To assess this claim, I augment
equation (1) by interacting the patrol-division indicators with Multiplei. Note from Figure 1
that divisions 1 through 4 lie mostly to the west of divisions 5 through 8. Estimates of this
specification are reported in Table 5. The second column reports the regression’s predicted
arrest rate within a division when Multiple = 0. The third column reports the coefficient on
the interaction term for the division’s indicator and Multiple.
While the arrest rate when Multiple = 0 varies a bit, the presence of multiple traffic
violations has a large negative effect on arrest rate across all eight patrol divisions of the
LMPD. This suggests that across all eight police divisions, pretextual stops were practiced,
and commonly predicated on failure-to-signal. It also suggests that the practice is not ex-
clusive to Louisville’s west-end neighborhoods. However, as section 4.3 will demonstrate,
pretextual stops are significantly more frequent on the west end.
4.3 Characteristics of Pretextual Stops
Section 4.2 provides evidence suggesting that pretextual stops in Louisville were commonly
predicated on failure-to-signal citations and sufficiently frequent to be detected in the data.
Here, I explore several characteristics these stops. Before attempting to characterize pre-
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textual stops, it’s important to recognize that stops in which failure-to-signal is the only
cited traffic violation are an imperfect identifier. Some of these stops may not have been
pretextual, and some pretextual stops may not have been based on failure-to-signal. While
we can’t determine whether or to what extent other stops in the data may have been pre-
textual, we can use stops in which failure-to-signal was the only traffic violation cited to
conservatively assess the frequency of pretextual stops.
Within my sample, excluding stops that led to DUI, the eight geographically-defined
LMPD patrol divisions conducted 5,756 stops in which failure-to-signal was the only cited
traffic violation. If we assume all such stops were pretextual, then pretextual stops were
conducted at least 1.64 times per day and 11.45 times per week, on average. These stops
resulted in 3,003 arrests. Alternatively, if we treat only the stops that resulted in arrest as
pretextual—equivalent to assuming that pretextual stops are based on perfect suspicion of
an arrestable offense—then pretextual stops occurred at least 0.95 times per day, or at least
6.66 times per week. Finally, the estimates in column (1) of Table 4 suggest an arrest rate of
0.2045 when failure-to-signal is one of multiple cited traffic violations. If we further assume
that, in addition to the 2,753 stops that did not lead to arrest, 690 of the stops resulting
in arrest were also conventional traffic stops, it implies among these 5,756 stops: 3,443 were
conventional traffic stops and 2,313 were pretextual stops. This composition arises if we
assume that pretextual stops always lead to arrest, and that conventional traffic stops in-
volving failure-to-signal result in arrest at a rate of about 0.2045.12 Even under this most
conservative set of assumptions, the data suggest that pretextual stops occurred at least 5.13
times per week.
Recall from Table 5 that within each of the LMPD patrol divisions, the presence of mul-
tiple traffic-violation citations produced substantial decreases in arrest rate. However, arrest
rates following stops in which failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation ranged
from 0.34 to 0.61 across divisions. Table 6 compares the frequencies with which likely pre-
12Hence the 690 arrests, which make for approximately 20.04 percent of 3,443 stops.
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textual stops and conventional moving-violation traffic stops are conducted within each of
the LMPD patrol divisions, and reveals significant disproportionality in the use of pretextual
stops in particular areas of the city.13 Notably, Division 2 accounts for more likely pretextual
stops and fewer conventional moving-violation stops, than any other division. Additionally,
Division 1 conducted more likely pretextual stops than five of the eight patrol divisions,
despite accounting for the second fewest conventional moving-violation traffic stops.
5 Driver Race and the Use of Pretextual Stops
Economic studies of racial disparities in traffic policing have typically focused on stop deci-
sions in general, or post-stop search decisions in general. Attempts to demonstrate a higher
search rate among minority motorists relative to observably similar white motorists, are often
undermined by concerns over omitted variables. Search decisions are informed by post-stop
interactions through which officers observe many factors that researchers cannot. Moreover,
if race correlates with propensity to carry contraband, optimal search decisions may produce
disparate search rates, what Arrow (1973) termed statistical discrimination. With data on
officer race, Antonovics and Knight (2009) partially circumvent these concerns. Inconsistent
with statistical discrimination, they find that officers in Boston were more likely to search
motorists of a different race.
Alternatively, Becker (1957) proposed a simple outcome test. Absent discrimination,
searches of marginal motorists—the least suspicious motorists that officers wish to search—
should turn up contraband at equal rates among minority and white motorists. If marginal
searches of minority motorists find contraband at lower rates, it suggests a lower thresh-
old was used against them, revealing racial bias due either to animus (so-called taste-based
discrimination) or race-specific errors in judging successful-search probabilities (inaccurate
statistical discrimination).
13Likely pretextual stops are those in which failure-to-signal is the only cited traffic violation. Conventional
moving-violation traffic stops are all traffic stops—excluding those that are likely pretextual—which include
a citation for at least one driving violation.
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In practice, the outcome (or “hit-rate”) test is complicated by an infra-marginality prob-
lem: researchers only observe average success rates and lack sufficient information to identify
the marginal searches. If the probability of carrying contraband is distributed differently
across races, average success rates by group may differ even if a race-neutral threshold
is applied. Knowles et al. (2001) develop a model suggesting that, in equilibrium, infra-
marginality may not arise if motorists strategically respond their race-specific search prob-
ability. Alternatively, Anwar and Fang (2006) partially circumvent the issue by noting that
absent racial bias, the ranking of search rates and average success rates for a given race of
motorists should be the independent of an officer’s race. With data from Florida Highway
Patrol they fail to reject a hypothesis of no relative racial prejudice.
By nature, pretextual stops are advantageous in overcoming these common challenges.
Following conventional traffic stops, there is a face-to-face interaction with the motorist
through which the officer observes many factors that are unobservable to researchers. The
pretextual stop however, is one in which desire to stop and search a vehicle are established
before a traffic violation is even committed. Thus, the omission in estimation of factors
observed post stop is no longer a concern, because these factors are also omitted from the
pretextual-stop decision itself.
Restricting attention to likely pretextual stops also helps to partially overcome infra-
marginality concerns. Recall that investigatory stops may be conducted when the officer has
articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion of a crime. When these articulable facts
are not present, a traffic violation may be used as pretext to conduct what is essentially
an investigatory stop. Thus, pretextual stops can be viewed as the marginal subgroup of
investigatory traffic stops. This means that many infra-marginal investigatory stops—those
where the standard of reasonable suspicion is met, and a stop can be initiated absent a traffic
violation—are effectively excluded when we focus solely on pretextual stops.
In addition to these advantageous features, I exploit the adoption and gradual deploy-
ment of body cams across LMPD patrol divisions to further circumvent the problem of
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infra-marginality. Before assessing how the deployment of body cams affected characteris-
tics of likely pretextual stops, I use the sample period prior to body-cam adoption to establish
baselines.
5.1 Racial Disparities Before Body-Cam Adoption
The economic literature mentioned earlier documents disparities faced by both blacks and
Hispanics in the US criminal justice system. As such, much of my analysis looks at these two
groups in tandem, and results are typically similar within each subgroup. It should be noted
however, that Hispanics account for a relatively small share (2.9 percent) of the observed
traffic citations in Louisville.
Before the adoption of body cams, black motorists accounted for 46.04 percent of likely
pretextual stops, and 26.30 percent of conventional traffic stops.14 Given the dispropor-
tionate representation (relative to conventional traffic stops) of black motorists in likely
pretextual stops, a natural question is how productive these stops are on average. Using
likely pretextual stops from January 1, 2010 through May 31, 2015 (the day before body
cams were initially deployed in the fifth patrol division), I estimate
Arresti = β1Blacki + β2Hispanici +Xi
′
θ + ǫi, (2)
where Blacki and Hispanici are indicators equal to 1 if a stopped motorist is black and
Hispanic, respectively. As before, the vector Xi contains fixed effects for the LMPD division
conducting the stop, as well as the hour of the day, day of the week, month of the year, and
year in which the stop occurred. I also augment equation (2) as
Arresti = γ1 (Blacki + Hispanici) +Xi
′
θ + ǫi, (3)
14Hispanic motorists accounted for 3.29 percent of likely pretextual stops, and 2.89 percent of conventional
traffic stops.
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and jointly estimate the difference in pretextual-stop arrest rate among black and Hispanic
motorists.
Table 7 reports estimates of equation (2) in columns (1) and (3), and estimates of equa-
tion (3) in columns (2) and (4). In columns (1) and (2), the estimating sample includes
stopped motorists of any race. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to stopped
motorists who are black, Hispanic, or white. Among motorists who are neither black nor
Hispanic, estimates in column (1) predict an arrest rate of 0.4646 in likely pretextual stops.
Relative those other motorists, the pretextual-stop arrest rate is 15.84 percent lower for black
motorists, 36.07 percent lower for Hispanic motorists, and 17.71 percent lower among black
and Hispanic motorists jointly. Among white motorists, estimates in column (3) predict a
pretextual-stop arrest rate of 0.4744. Relative to white motorists, the pretextual-stop arrest
rate is 17.18 percent lower for black motorists, 37.42 percent lower for Hispanic motorists,
and 19.06 percent lower for black and Hispanic motorists jointly.
Table 7 reveals aggregate disparities in arrest rate conditional on a likely pretextual stop.
This is notable because, even if significant racial disparities exist at the individual-officer
level, disparities might not appear in the aggregate if officers are sufficiently heterogeneous.
The data do not report identifiers for individual officers. However, I augment equation (3)
by interacting (Blacki + Hispanici) with the division fixed effects, and examine heterogeneity
across patrol divisions. Estimates of this augmented specification are reported in Table 8.
The estimating sample for column group (1) includes likely pretextual stops of all motorists.
For column group (2), the estimating sample is restricted to stopped motorists who are black,
Hispanic, or white.
The estimates in Table 8 show that racial disparities in pretextual-stop arrest rate were
somewhat specific to particular patrol divisions. While the pretextual-stop arrest rate among
black and Hispanic motorists is lower within all divisions, among the fourth and fifth divi-
sions, the difference is very small and statistically insignificant. In the second, seventh, and
eighth divisions however, the disparity is statistically significant and very large.
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Prior to body-cam deployment, while black and Hispanic motorists account for a dis-
proportionately large share of likely pretextual stops, these stops were significantly less pro-
ductive on average. Pretextual stops impose costs on the motorists involved. So whatever
the source of this disparity, that result itself is quite meaningful. Yet, the lower pretextual-
stop arrest rate among this group may not be due to racial bias. If race-neutral thresholds
for pretextual stops were implemented, such disparities could arise from infra-marginality.
Perhaps all motorists are subjected to the same pretextual-stop threshold, but conditional
on meeting that threshold, white motorists are more likely to have committed arrestable
offenses.
The adoption and deployment of body cams can shed light on which potential source
of the disparity is more likely. Patrol officers are permitted to use failure-to-signal as a
basis for pretextual traffic stops; but they are not supposed to use driver race as a factor in
stop decisions. If the initial disparity results from infra-marginality, we wouldn’t expect the
deployment of body cams to significantly affect the disparity. However, if the disparity is
more the result of different race-dependent thresholds for pretextual stops, the heightened
accountability that body cams bring about may lead to a reduction in the disparity.
5.2 The Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Pretextual Stop Fre-
quency
Before turning to arrest rates, I assess whether body-worn cameras affected the frequency of
likely pretextual stops. My full sample is composed of 502 full weeks, indexed by w.15 Let
Yj,w denote the number of likely pretextual stops that patrol division j made in week w of
the sample. So long as the timing of body-cam deployment is uncorrelated with unobserved
factors that influence Y, a treatment effect of body cams is identified by the “two-way fixed
15January 1, 2010 was a Friday. In order to have weekly periods beginning on Sundays, the first period
includes 9 days.
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effects” (TWFE) specification:
Yj,w = γ1BodyCamj,w + φj + ψw + ǫj,w. (4)
BodyCamj,w equals 1 if body cams were deployed for division j in, or before, week w.
Goodman-Bacon (2018) demonstrates that the OLS coefficient, γˆ1, will be a variance-
weighted average of all possible “two-by-two difference-in-differences” (2× 2 DD) estimates.
A possible 2× 2 DD estimate exists between two divisions, over a period where the status of
BodyCam changes for one division, and does not change for the other. In later periods, this
will include comparisons of divisions where body cams are deployed, with divisions where
body cams were already deployed. In light of this property, attributing γˆ1 to the effect of
body cams assumes parallel trends in all of these different counterfactual outcomes. That
is, over a where period body-cam status switches for one division but does not for another,
Y would have exhibited a common trend for both divisions following the week of the status
switch, had body-cam status not changed in that week.
This underlying assumption can be partially supported by accounting for any divisional
differences in trends prior to division 5’s deployment week. I implement this by regressing
Yj,w from that period on division fixed effects interacted with a linear monthly trend variable.
I then use full-sample residuals from this regression as the dependent variable and re-estimate
equation (4). The estimate from this approach, is reported in column (2) of Table 9. Results
for the regression producing these residuals are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix, and
show no significant differences in divisional trends. Estimates of equation (4) as specified are
reported in column (1). Both approaches suggest an effect of body-cams on pretextual-stop
frequency that is negative, yet small and not significantly different from zero at conventional
significance levels.
Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that if the treatment effect of interest grows (away from
zero) over time, the two-way fixed effects estimator will be biased toward understating the
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true effect. An alternative approach that circumvents this issue is to compare outcomes
for divisions at similar stages relative to their deployment week. I construct the following
specification:
Yj,w =
3∑
f=0
(θf × Ij,w,f ) +
−2∑
f=−6
(θf × Ij,w,f ) + φj + ǫj,w, (5)
where f represents one-year periods defined about divisions’ body-cam deployment weeks.
For the 52-week period beginning with a division’s deployment week, f = 0. For the 52-week
period ending just before a division’s deployment week, f = −1. In a division’s second-to-
last untreated (by body cams) year, f = −2, and so on. Ij,w,f is an indicator of division j
being in period f about body-cam deployment, during week w. By construction, f = 3 when
divisions are in at least their fourth treated year, and f = −6 when divisions are not yet
in their fifth-to-last untreated year. This leaves the last year before body-cam deployment
as the only stage not controlled for. As such, θf is the conditional expectation of Y when
divisions are in half-year f about body-cam deployment, minus the conditional expectation
of Y in divisions’ last years before body-cam deployment.
In addition to estimating the equation as specified above, I also include controls for four
separate points in time which might have affected policing decisions (regarding pretextual
stops and in general). Though they don’t give exact dates, Schaefer et al. (2017) report that
the LMPD’s initial exploratory research of body cams began in the fall of 2012, and that in
the fall of 2013 the department sought price quotes from body-cam vendors. Because both
actions might be perceived as signaling greater scrutiny of officer behavior from leadership,
I include an indicator equaling 1 in the weeks including and after October 1, 2012, and an
indicator equal to 1 in the weeks including and after October 1, 2013. I also control for two
events stemming from the officer-involved shooting on Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.
Schaefer et al. (2017) suggest that the national attention the incident received shifted public
interest in body cams within Louisville, and ultimately led to the city funding their adoption.
Due to this, and because the attention the incident received may have caused changes in
police behavior, I include two additional indicators. The first equals 1 in, and after, the week
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beginning August 10, 2014 (two days after the shooting). The second equals 1 in, and after,
the week beginning November 23, 2014. November 23 was the day before the announcement
that the grand jury hearing the case had decided not to indict the officer involved, which
was followed by several days of protest.
Estimates of equation (5) as specified, are reported in Table 10. Column (2) reports
estimates with the controls for accounting possible changes following: initial exploration of
body cam adoption, solicitation of vendor quotes regarding body cams, the officer-involved
shooting of Michael Brown (in a different city and state), and the decision not to indict
the involved officer. In addition to these controls, estimates in column (3) include division-
specific linear annual time trends (by year of the sample). In particular, the specifications
used in columns (2) and (3) appear fairly supportive common trends in the time periods
leading to body-cam deployment. Both suggest an initial statistically-significant decrease in
pretextual stop frequency following body-cam deployment, however, the effect appears short
lived. Figure A1 of the Appendix presents the coefficient and 95-percent confidence intervals
from column (3) of this table. Ultimately, there is little evidence to suggest an effect of body
cams on pretextual-stop frequency.
5.3 The Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Pretextual-Stop Arrest
Rates
The outcome variable in section 5.2 is a weekly count of likely pretextual stops within a
division. In 32.4 percent of observations, that count is zero. To assess the effect of body
cams on pretextual-stop arrest rates, estimation must occur at the traffic-stop level. With a
similar specification to equation (4), I begin by estimating
Arresti,j,t = λ1BodyCami,j,t + φj + ψw(t) + ǫi,j,t. (6)
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Arresti,j,t equals 1 if stop i, made on date t and by division j, results in arrest, and equals 0
otherwise. Division and week-of-sample fixed effects are also included.
Using likely pretextual stops, estimates of equation (6) as specified are reported in col-
umn (1) of Table 11. In column (2), day-of-week fixed effects are also added. In columns
(3) and (4), controls for the four events mentioned in section 5.2—which might have affected
pretextual-stop decisions and subsequent arrest rates—are added to the specifications from
columns (1) and (2), respectively. Across all four specifications, estimates suggest a signifi-
cant and very large positive effect of body cams on the arrest rate in likely pretextual stops.
Prior to division 5’s deployment date, likely pretextual stops yielded an arrest rate of 0.4500.
Relative to that rate, these estimates suggest a 33 to 34 percent increase in pretextual-stop
arrest rate with body cams in use.
On March 11, 2016, division 6 became the last division to have body cams deployed. This
last deployment occurred much later than other divisions due to a connectivity issue with
division 6 that required the installation of new fiber optic cables. Table A5 of the Appendix
reports estimates of equation (6) under the same four specifications, but with the sample
restricted to observations before division 6’s deployment date. This estimates the effect of
body cams using only the period where pretextual-stop arrest rates, with and without body
cams in use, could be contemporaneously observed. These estimates are very similar to those
using the full sample in sign, significance, and magnitude.
Finally, Table A6 of the Appendix reports results from regressing Arresti,j,t on division
fixed effects, interacted with a linear monthly trend, using likely pretextual stops made prior
to division 5’s deployment date. Using full-sample residuals from that regression as a depen-
dent variable, Table A7 reports estimates mirroring those in Table 11. Even after removing
all pre-deployment differences in trends across divisions, the presence of body cams suggests
a significant and fairly large increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate.
The OLS estimate λˆ1 from equation (6) relies partially on comparisons of arrest rates for
divisions in periods where BodyCamj,w switches from 0 to 1, with arrest rates for divisions
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where BodyCamj,w equals 1 throughout that same period. This could be problematic if the
effect of body cams on pretextual-stop arrest rates evolves over time. Thus, similar to the
approach employed in equation (5), I implement an “event study” specification
Arresti,j,t =
3∑
f=0
(θf × Ii,j,t,f ) +
−2∑
f=−6
(θf × Ii,j,t,f ) + φj + ǫi,j,t, (7)
for pretextual-stop arrest rate as well.
In equation (7), f represents one-year periods defined about divisions’ body-cam deploy-
ment dates. For the 364-day period beginning on a department’s deployment date, f = 0.
For the 364-day period ending the day before a division’s deployment date, f = −1. In
a division’s second-to-last untreated year, f = −2, and so on. Ii,j,t,f indicates that stop i,
made on date t in division j, occurred in year f about deployment. By construction, f = 3
when divisions are in at least their fourth treated year, and f = −6 when divisions are not
yet in their fifth-to-last untreated year. This leaves the last untreated year as the only such
period not captured by an indicator. As such, θf is the conditional expectation of Arresti,j,t
when divisions are in year f about body-cam deployment, minus the conditional expectation
of Arresti,j,t when divisions are in their last untreated year.
Column (1) of Table 12 reports estimates of equation (7) with LMPD Division fixed
effects, and controls for any changes that may have been caused by: the LMPD’s initial
research of body-cam adoption, the LMPD’s solicitation of bids from body-cam vendors,
the officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, or the grand-jury decision
not to indict the officer involved months later. In column (2), day-of-week fixed effects are
also included. In column (3), division-specific linear annual trends are also included to ac-
count for any division-level differences in trend that might otherwise confound estimation of
body cams’ effect. Estimates across all three specifications are quite similar. They suggest
significant and substantial increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate with body cams in use.
This affect is immediately apparent following body-cam deployment, and mostly stable and
23
persistent in the years that follow. Figure 2 plots the coefficients from column (3) and their
95-percent confidence intervals in these annual periods about body-cam deployment. Impor-
tantly, the significant increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate following body-cam deployment
does not appear to stem from a pre-existing trend.
5.4 The Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Racial Disparities
Prior to division 5’s deployment date, black and Hispanic motorists were arrested at a
significantly lower rate in likely pretextual stops. Section 5.3 shows a significant increase
in pretextual-stop arrest rate following body-cam deployment, suggesting that the threshold
(across all motorists) for initiating pretextual stops increased. Examining the composition
of this increase among black and Hispanic motorists relative to others can shed light on
whether the initial disparity was more likely the result of bias or infra-marginality.
Let BHi indicate that stop i was of a black or Hispanic motorist. Including BHi as well
its interaction with BodyCam, I augment equation (6) as follows:
Arresti,j,t = ρ1
(
BodyCami,j,t × BHi
)
+ ρ2BodyCami,j,t + ρ3BHi + φj + ψw(t) + ǫi,j,t. (8)
Conditional on division and week-of-sample fixed effects: ρ3 is the difference in expected ar-
rest rate, conditional on division and week-of-sample fixed effects, between black or Hispanic
motorists and all others, prior to body-cam deployment; ρ2 is the difference in expected
arrest rate from pre-deployment to post-deployment for a motorist that is neither black
nor Hispanic; and (ρ1 + ρ2) is the difference in expected arrest rate from pre-deployment
to post-deployment for a black or Hispanic motorist. Finally, ρ1 is the difference in body
cams’ effects on expected pretextual-stop arrest rate between black or Hispanic and other
motorists.
Estimates of equation (8) are reported in Table 13. Column (1) reports estimates of the
equation as specified above. In column (2) day-of-week fixed effects are also included. In
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columns (3) and (4) the indicators switching to 1 after: September 2012, September 2013,
the officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown, and the subsequent failure to indict the offi-
cer; as well as the interactions of these indicators with BHi, are added to the specifications
used in columns (1) and (2) respectively. If any of those four events caused a change in
the racial arrest-rate disparity, the inclusion of these controls will protect against mistakenly
attributing that change to the effect of body cams.
Across all four specifications we see a significant increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate
among non-black and non-Hispanic motorists following the deployment of body cams. In
column (1), notice that the pretextual-stop arrest rate is lower among black and Hispanic
motorist 0.0843 prior to division 5’s deployment date.16 Beyond the rise of 0.1194 exhibited
among other motorists, the arrest rate among black and Hispanic motorists in likely pretex-
tual stops exhibits an additional increase of 0.0706 following body-cam deployment. This
additional increase is statistically significant and overcomes 83.75 percent of the initial dis-
parity. After controlling for the day of the week in which a stop occurs, results remain very
similar. In the other two specifications, the additional increase among black and Hispanic
is slightly smaller, yet overcomes 61.8 to 64.18 percent of the initial disparity. While this
additional increase—beyond the increase exhibited by other motorists—is not significantly
different from 0 at conventional levels, the overall increase in pretextual-stop arrest rate
among black and Hispanic motorists is. Across columns (1) through (4), the effect of body
cams on pretextual-stop arrest rate is estimated to be: 0.1900, 0.1908, 0.1791, and 0.1825.
All are different from zero at the 99-percent significance level.
Beneath the three coefficients and their standard errors, Table 13 reports the sum,
(ρˆ1 + ρˆ3), and its standard error. In column (1) and (2), this is simply the estimated dispar-
ity when body cams are in use, conditional on division, week-of-sample, and (in the latter
column) day-of-week fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4) the controls for the four aforemen-
tioned events and their interaction with black-or-Hispanic indicator. The first of these events
16As expected, this is very similar to what was found in section 5.1.
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begins October 1, 2012, and reductions in the arrest-rate disparity between that date and a
division’s body-cam deployment date is not attributed to body.17 Thus, in those columns, ρˆ3
estimates the racial disparity prior to October 1, 2012, and (ρˆ1 + ρˆ3) estimates the disparity
that remains after accounting for the effect attributed to body cams. In columns (1) and (2),
notice that with body cams in use, the estimated racial disparity in pretextual-stop arrest
rate is very small and statistically insignificant. In columns (3) and (4), as expected, the
remaining disparity is larger, but still much smaller than the estimated disparity prior to
the LMPD’s initial research on body-cam implementation. When restricting the estimating
sample to prior to division 6’s deployment date, Table A8 shows estimates that are similar
in magnitude.
A potential concern regarding these estimates is that, prior to body-cam deployment,
the pretextual-stop arrest rate among black and Hispanic motorists may have been on an
upward trend relative to other motorists. If so, this pre-existing difference in trends may be
mistakenly attributed to the effect of body cams. Inclusion of the four event-specific controls,
along with their interactions with BHi helps to alleviate some of this concern. However, to
further address this, I estimate the following equation:
Arresti,j,t = χ1 (Trendt × BHi) + χ2Trendt + χ3BHi + φj + ψw(t) + ǫi,j,t, (9)
using pretextual stops prior to division 5’s deployment date. The linear trend variable is
monthly. In addition to the four specifications used for equation (8), I also estimate a simple
specification where the trend, BHi, and their interaction are the only variables included.
These estimates, reported in Table A9 of the Appendix, all fail to reject a common pre-trend
between the two groups of motorists. Notice also, that when the event-specific controls and
interactions are included, χˆ1 becomes negative. These results further alleviate concerns over
pre-deployment trends among the two subgroups.
17The estimates indicate that the disparity did decrease on average during that period.
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5.5 Racial Disparities and Visibility of Race
Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) developed a “veil-of-darkness” test for racial bias in routine
traffic stops which exploits the fact that driver race is more difficult to observe in darkness.18
Borrowing on that intuition, I re-estimate equation (8) with the sample restricted to stops
made during periods of daylight only. Using data for Louisville collected from https://
www.timeanddate.com, I restrict the estimation sample to stops made after the beginning
(in the morning), and before the end (in the evening), of civil twilight on a given date. This
provides a more refined assessment of racial disparities as it limits analysis to observations
where race is more easily observed prior to a stop.
Estimates of equation (8), using likely pretextual stops made during daylight, are reported
in Table 14. These results reveal that, excluding stops made during darkness—when driver
race is more difficult to observe—body cams have a much smaller effect on pretextual-stop
arrest rate among non-black and non-Hispanic motorists. Columns (1) and (2) show that the
initial racial disparity is even larger when restricting analysis to stops made during daylight.
Prior to division 5’s deployment date, the pretextual-stop arrest rate was 0.5289 for white
motorists during daylight. Relative to whites over that same period, the estimates in columns
(1) and (2) suggest a pretextual-stop arrest rate among black and Hispanic motorists that
was 21.35 to 21.54 percent lower during daylight. Moreover, across all four specifications, the
use of body cams has an additional effect on pretextual-stop arrest rate that is very large,
and statistically significant at conventional levels. This additional increase among black and
Hispanic motorists during daylight, is enough to overcome anywhere from 71.50 to 97.05
percent of the initial disparity.
18Extensions of the test are found in Horrace and Rohlin (2016), Kalinowski et al. (2017), and Ritter
(2017).
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Figure 1: LMPD Patrol Divisions
Map of the eight geographically-defined patrol divsions of the LMPD. Image is from the de-
partment’s 2014 annual report, retrieved online at: https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/
files/police/sop_searchable_and_reports/lmpd_2014_annual_report-final.pdf.
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Figure 2: Event Study: Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate and Body-Cam Deployment
This figure plots θˆf from estimating equation (7) under the specifcation reported in column (3) of
Table 12. The horizontal axis tracks one-year periods defined about each division’s body-cam de-
ployment date. The value 0 marks the first treated year. The vertical axis measures the pretextual-
stop arrest rate about the average frequency in divisions’ last year before body-cam deployment.
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Table 1: Traffic Violation Summary Statistics
Pct. Traffic
Violation Obs. Stops with Violation
Objective Driving Violations
Speeding 215,574 50.70
Disregarding Traffic Light 20,159 4.74
Disregarding Stop Sign 15,702 3.69
Failure to Signal 9,374 2.20
Use Communication Device 1,674 0.39
Improper Turn 1,615 0.38
Fail to Yield Right-of-Way 1,050 0.25
Subjective Driving Violations
Reckless Driving 12,250 2.88
Careless Driving 12,094 2.84
Following too Close 3,591 0.84
Improper Passing 1,145 0.27
Too Fast for Conditions 544 0.13
Non-driving Violations
Invalid Plate/Registration 145,317 33.17
One Head Light 13,062 3.07
No Tail Lights 3,569 0.84
Fail to Illuminate Head Lights 2,898 0.68
No Brake Lights 2,711 0.64
Obstructed Vision/Windshield 1,870 0.44
Fail to Dim Head Lights 881 0.21
Reported statistics are from citations issued by officers in the eight geographically-defined partol
divisions of the LMPD. Sample period: January 1, 2010 to August 19, 2019.
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Table 2: LMPD Deployment of Body-Worn Cameras
LMPD Patrol Division Date of Body-Cam Deployment
Fifth Division June 1, 2015
Second Division July 21, 2015
First Division August 4, 2015
Fourth Division August 12, 2015
Third Division August 18, 2015
Ninth Mobile Division August 20, 2015
Seventh Division September 24, 2015
Eighth Division October 2, 2015
Sixth Division March 11, 2016
Table 3: Arrest Rates and the Presence of Multiple Traffic Violations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti Arresti Arresti Arresti
Multiple -0.3172*** 0.0280*** 0.0424*** 0.0525***
(0.0109) (0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0083)
Intercept 0.5217*** 0.0061*** 0.0597*** 0.0773**
(0.0171) (0.0007) (0.0061) (0.0112)
Sample: stops Disregarding Disregarding
including Failure to Signal Speeding Traffic Light Stop Sign
R-squared 0.0921 0.0076 0.0039 0.0048
N 8,641 213,693 19,283 15,341
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates with no additional controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-
year level, are reported in parentheses. “Sample: stops including” indicates that the column’s
estimates are from stops including the violation listed (excluding any resulting in DUI).
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Table 4: Arrest Rates and the Presence of Multiple Traffic Violations: Full Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti Arresti Arresti Arresti
Multiple -0.2870*** 0.0268*** 0.0260*** 0.0067
(0.0114) (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0077)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Hour-of-Day FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Sample: stops Disregarding Disregarding
including Failure to Signal Speeding Traffic Light Stop Sign
R-squared 0.1523 0.0150 0.0541 0.1202
N 8,641 213,693 19,283 15,341
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in
parentheses. “Sample: stops including” indicates that the column’s estimates are from stops in-
cluding the violation listed (excluding any resulting in DUI).
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Table 5: Arrest Rate and the Presence of Multiple Traffic Violations: Failure-to-Signal by
Patrol Division
LMPD Division Ârrest0 Multiple
Division 1 0.5839 -0.2709***
(0.0191)
Division 2 0.6101 -0.3085***
(0.0200)
Division 3 0.4891 -0.3205***
(0.0231)
Division 4 0.5502 -0.3057***
(0.0384)
Division 5 0.3473 -0.2312***
(0.0290)
Division 6 0.5024 -0.3063***
(0.0240)
Division 7 0.4158 -0.2663***
(0.0225)
Division 8 0.3413 -0.2323***
(0.0330)
R-squared 0.1530
N 8,641
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops involving failure-to-signal. Within each division, Ârrest0 is the predicted
arrest rate when Multiple = 0. The third column reports the interaction term between a division’s
indicator and Multiplei. Robust standard errors for those coefficients, clustered at the division-by-
year level, are reported in parentheses. Addition controls: LMPD Division FE, hour-of-day FE,
day-of-week FE, month-of-year FE, year FE.
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Table 6: Conventional and Likely Pretextual Traffic Stops by Patrol Division
Conventional
Likely Pretextual Stops† Moving-Violation Stops
LMPD Division N Arrests Arrest Rate N Arrests Arrest Rate
Division 1 995 581 0.5839 11,384 1,263 0.1109
Division 2 1,226 748 0.6101 8,905 1,229 0.1380
Division 3 597 292 0.4891 24,450 910 0.0372
Division 4 1,165 641 0.5502 25,895 1,317 0.0509
Division 5 311 108 0.3473 57,686 502 0.0087
Division 6 615 309 0.5024 49,757 960 0.0193
Division 7 469 195 0.4158 37,554 598 0.0159
Division 8 378 129 0.3413 50,128 575 0.0115
†Likely pretextual stops are those in which failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation.
Conventional moving-violation stops are those that: (1) result in the citation of at least one moving
violation, and (2) don’t belong to the likely pretextual category. Both categories exclude stops
resulting in DUI.
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Table 7: Racial Disparities in Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate Before Body-Cam Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti Arresti Arresti Arresti
Black -0.0736*** — -0.0815*** —
(0.0196) — (0.0188) —
Hispanic -0.1676*** — -0.1775*** —
(0.0423) — (0.0427) —
Black or Hispanic — -0.0823*** — -0.0904***
— (0.0189) — (0.0182)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Hour-of-Day FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Black, Black,
Sampled Motorists All All Hispanic & White Hispanic & White
R-squared 0.0681 0.0670 0.0678 0.0667
N 3,369 3,369 3,281 3,281
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure to signal was the only cited traffic violation. All stops are
prior to June 1, 2015. The estimating sample for columns (1) and (2) includes motorists of any
race. Estimates in columns (3) and (4) are from stops of black, Hispanic, and white motorists only.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: Racial Disparities in Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate Before Body-Cam Adoption
(1) (2)
LMPD Division Ârrest0 (Black or Hispanic) Ârrest0 (Black or Hispanic)
Division 1 0.5097 -0.0579** 0.5153 -0.0637**
(0.0243) (0.0216)
Division 2 0.6968 -0.1768*** 0.7034 -0.1811***
(0.0408) (0.0361)
Division 3 0.4905 -0.0727 0.5033 -0.0844
(0.0713) (0.0696)
Division 4 0.4500 -0.0154 0.4602 -0.0273
(0.0308) (0.0301)
Division 5 0.3082 -0.0066 0.3182 -0.0174
(0.1034) (0.1023)
Division 6 0.5298 -0.0738 0.5506 -0.0839
(0.0559) (0.0605)
Division 7 0.4225 -0.1641*** 0.4375 -0.1795***
(0.0446) (0.0497)
Division 8 0.3380 -0.1022* 0.3383 -0.1032*
(0.0512) (0.0478)
Sampled Motorists All Black, Hispanic & White
R-squared 0.0700 0.0695
N 3,369 3,281
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure to signal was the only cited traffic violation. All stops
are prior to June 1, 2015. The estimating sample for column group (1) includes motorists of any
race, for column group (2) it is stops of black, Hispanic, and white motorists only. Ârrest0 is the
predicted arrest rate in a division when the motorist is neither black nor Hispanic. Coefficients on
a division’s indicator and the indicator for a stopped motorist being black or Hispanic are reported
in the second column of each group. Robust standard errors for these coefficients, clustered at the
division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. For both samples, the additional controls are:
LMPD Division FE, hour-of-day FE, day-of-week FE, month-of-year FE, and year FE.
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Table 9: Body-Worn Cameras and the Frequency of Likely Pretextual Stops
(1) (2)
Variable Yj,w Residual Yj,w
BodyCam -0.2511 -0.2488
(0.1950) (0.1902)
LMPD Division FE Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y
Division-Specific Pre-Trends Removed N Y
R-squared 0.3293 0.1904
N 4,016 4,016
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates with division-week unit of observation. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in column (1), Yj,w,
is the number of likely pretextual stops made by division j during week-of-the-sample w. The
dependent variable in column (2) is the residual from regressing Yj,w, in the period prior to Division
5’s deployment week (the first deployment week in the sample), on division fixed effects interacted
with a weekly trend. The estimates that produced these residuals are reported in Table A4 of the
Appendix.
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Table 10: Body-Worn Cameras and the Frequency of Likely Pretextual Stops: Event Study
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Yj,w Yj,w Yj,w
After third treated year -0.0272 -0.0034 -0.3130
(0.1565) (0.1531) (0.2822)
Third treated year 0.4183** 0.4412** 0.2369
(0.1942) (0.1913) (0.2315)
Second treated year -0.1082 -0.0852 -0.2179
(0.1255) (0.1220) (0.1574)
First treated year -0.2548*** -0.2319*** -0.2916***
(0.0776) (0.0727) (0.0885)
Second-to-last untreated year 0.0986 0.2541 0.2717*
(0.1125) (0.1632) (0.1569)
Third-to-last untreated year 0.1779** 0.1823 0.1875
(0.0769) (0.2666) (0.2486)
Fourth-to-last untreated year 0.1562 0.0019 -0.0312
(0.1230) (0.3701) (0.3448)
Fifth-to-last untreated year 0.2524*** 0.0881 0.1210
(0.0878) (0.3720) (0.3660)
More than five years before treatment 0.0833 -0.0823 -0.0450
(0.1264) (0.3711) (0.3717)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y
Post September 2012 FE N Y Y
Post September 2013 FE N Y Y
Post Michael Brown Shooting FE N Y Y
Post Grand Jury Decision FE N Y Y
Division-Specific Annual Trends N N Y
R-squared 0.2108 0.2118 0.2278
N 4,016 4,016 4,016
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates. Unit of observation is a division-week. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 11: The Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam 0.1504** 0.1526*** 0.1507** 0.1529***
(0.0576) (0.0562) (0.0576) (0.0562)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post Michael Brown Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grand Jury Decision FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.1493 0.1528 0.1497 0.1652
N 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. Arresti,j,t indicates
an arrest occuring in stop i, made on date t, by division j.
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Table 12: Body-Worn Cameras and Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate: Event Study
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
After third treated year 0.0833*** 0.0864*** 0.1332**
(0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0607)
Third treated year 0.0729** 0.0744** 0.1169**
(0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0475)
Second treated year 0.0891*** 0.0889*** 0.1163***
(0.0303) (0.0305) (0.0336)
First treated year 0.1061*** 0.1038*** 0.1145***
(0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0305)
Second-to-last untreated year -0.0325 -0.0242 -0.0278
(0.0519) (0.0523) (0.0502)
Third-to-last untreated year -0.1142* -0.1035 -0.1147*
(0.0672) (0.0665) (0.0668)
Fourth-to-last untreated year 0.0116 0.0225 -0.0019
(0.1014) (0.1010) (0.1007)
Fifth-to-last untreated year 0.0234 0.0316 -0.0114
(0.0969) (0.0959) (0.1005)
More than five years before treatment 0.1137 0.1211 0.0623
(0.1041) (0.1030) (0.1063)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y
Post September 2012 FE Y Y Y
Post September 2013 FE Y Y Y
Post Michael Brown Shooting FE Y Y Y
Post Grand Jury Decision FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y Y
Division-Specific Annual Trends N N Y
R-squared 0.0618 0.0654 0.0708
N 5,756 5,756 5,756
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 13: Body-Worn Cameras and Racial Disparities in Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam× BHi 0.0706*** 0.0683*** 0.0521 0.0541
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0404) (0.0397)
BodyCam 0.1194** 0.1226** 0.1270** 0.1284**
(0.0585) (0.0573) (0.0617) (0.0611)
BHi -0.0843*** -0.0852*** -0.0993*** -0.1002***
(0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.0276)
(BodyCam× BHi) + BHi -0.0136 -0.0169 -0.0472 -0.0460
(0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0484) (0.0473)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.1528 0.1565 0.1537 0.1574
N 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. BHi equals 1 if
the stopped motorist is black or Hispanic, and 0 otherwise. Each column reports three regres-
sion coefficients followed by their standard errors. Then, the sum of the column’s coefficients on
(BodyCam× BHi) and BHi are reported followed by the standard error for the combination. This
estimates the racial disparity in arrest rate following the effect of body cams.
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Table 14: Body-Worn Cameras and Racial Disparities During Daylight
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam× BHi 0.0860** 0.0807** 0.1265** 0.1283***
(0.0376) (0.0370) (0.0496) (0.0483)
BodyCam 0.0410 0.0405 0.0255 0.0224
(0.0933) (0.0945) (0.0961) (0.0989)
BHi -0.1139*** -0.1129*** -0.1332*** -0.1322***
(0.0229) (0.0225) (0.0350) (0.0340)
(BodyCam× BHi) + BHi -0.0279 -0.0322 -0.0067 -0.0039
(0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0594) (0.0575)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.2234 0.2266 0.2253 0.2286
N 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation. All stops were
made after the beginning, and before the end of, civil twilight. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. BHi equals 1 if the stopped motorist is
black or Hispanic, and 0 otherwise. Each column reports three regression coefficients followed by
their standard errors. Then, the sum of the column’s coefficients on (BodyCam× BHi) and BHi
are reported followed by the standard error for the combination. This estimates the racial disparity
in arrest rate following the effect of body cams.
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Figure A1: Event Study: Pretextual Stop Frequency and Body-Cam Deployment
This figure plots θˆf from estimating equation (5) under the specifcation reported in column (3)
of Table 10. The horizontal axis tracks one-year periods defined about each division’s body-cam
deployment week. The value 0 marks the first treated year. The vertical axis measures the frequency
likely pretextual stops at the division-week level about the average frequency in divisions’ last year
before body-cam deployment.
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Table A1: Post-Stop Arrest Rates Conditional on Common Traffic Violations
Traffic Stops
Violation Arrest Rate (S.E.) Including Violation
Objective Driving Violations
Speeding 0.0087 (0.0002) 213,693
Disregarding Traffic Light 0.0665 (0.0018) 19,283
Disregarding Stop Sign 0.0859 (0.0023) 15,341
Failure to Signal 0.4158 (0.0053) 8,641
Subjective Driving Violations
Careless Driving 0.0939 (0.0028) 10,751
Reckless Driving 0.1976 (0.0041) 9,514
Non-driving Violations
Invalid Plate/Registration 0.0870 (0.0008) 138,209
One Head Light 0.0615 (0.0021) 12,765
Reported statistics are from stops conducted by the eight geographically-defined partol divisions
of the LMPD, and exclude stops resulting in charges of DUI.
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Table A2: Failure-to-Signal Stops: Summary of Other Traffic Violations
Violation Citations Pct. of other Traffic Violation Citations
Careless Driving 357 9.59
Disregarding Stop Sign 299 8.03
Disregarding Traffic Light 175 4.70
Fail to Dim Head Lights 4 0.11
Fail to Illuminate Head Lights 23 0.62
Failure to Yield Right-of-Way 4 0.11
Following too Close 106 2.85
Improper Passing 59 1.58
Improper Turn 54 1.45
Invalid Plate/Registration 1,320 35.45
No Brake Lights 68 1.83
No Tail Lights 36 0.97
Obstructed Vision/Windshield 54 1.45
One Head Light 94 2.52
Other 97 2.60
Reckless 299 8.03
Speeding 642 17.24
Too Fast for Conditions 13 0.35
Use Communication Device 20 0.54
Reported statistics are from stops in which failure-to-signal was one of multiple cited traffic viola-
tions. Stops resulting in DUI charges are excluded.
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Table A3: Arrest Rate and the Presence of Multiple Traffic Violations: Alternative Specifi-
cations
(1) (2)
Variable Arresti Arresti
Multiple -0.2870*** -0.2798***
(0.0114) (0.0120)
LMPD Division FE Y N
(LMPD Division× Beat) FE N Y
Hour-of-Day FE Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
R-squared 0.1523 0.1620
N 8,641 8,641
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops involving failure-to-signal. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses.
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Table A4: Frequency of Likely Pretextual Stops: Pre-Deployment Trends
Variable Yj,w
(Trend)× (Division 5 ) 0.0030
(0.0067)
Division 5 -0.7649***
(0.2363)
(Trend)× (Division 2 ) 0.0035
(0.0052)
Division 2 0.7670***
(0.2053)
(Trend)× (Division 1 ) -0.0068
(0.0061)
Division 1 0.7090***
(0.2102)
(Trend)× (Division 4 ) -0.0078
(0.0056)
Division 4 0.9086***
(0.2429)
(Trend)× (Division 3 ) 0.0038
(0.0054)
Division 3 -0.1786
(0.229)
(Trend)× (Division 7 ) 0.0061
(0.0057)
Division 7 -0.6150**
(0.2471)
(Trend)× (Division 8 ) 0.0030
(0.0062)
Division 8 -0.4706**
(0.2188)
Trend -0.0024
(0.0042)
Intercept 1.5086***
(0.1677)
R-squared 0.1348
N 2,256
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from the period prior to Division 5’s deployment week (first in the sample). Yj,w, is
the number of likely pretextual stops made by division j during week-of-the-sample w. The linear
trend variable is the month of the sample. Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-year
level, are reported in parentheses. Division 6 is absorbed by the intercept.
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Table A5: Body-Worn Cameras and Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate: Before March 11, 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam 0.1567** 0.1600*** 0.1571** 0.1604***
(0.0631) (0.0596) (0.0632) (0.0597)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post Michael Brown Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grand Jury Decision FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.1365 0.1446 0.1372 0.1453
N 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation, and prior to
Division 6’s deployment date (the latest in the sample). Robust standard errors, clustered at the
division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses.
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Table A6: Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate: Pre-Deployment Trends
Variable Arresti,j,t
(Trend)× (Division 5) 0.0001
(0.0006)
Division 5 -0.1961***
(0.0647)
(Trend)× (Division 2) 0.0010**
(0.0004)
Division 2 -0.0609
(0.0603)
(Trend)× (Division 1) 0.0011***
(0.0004)
Division 1 -0.1617***
(0.0589)
(Trend)× (Division 4) 0.0010***
(0.0003)
Division 4 -0.1792***
(0.0395)
(Trend)× (Division 3) 0.0007*
(0.0004)
Division 3 -0.0919
(0.0640)
(Trend)× (Division 7) 0.0011***
(0.0003)
Division 7 -0.2777***
(0.0305)
(Trend)× (Division 8) -0.0001
(0.0005)
Division 8 -0.1582**
(0.0633)
Trend -0.0033***
(0.0010)
Intercept 0.5897***
(0.0241)
R-squared 0.0309
N 3,369
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from the period prior to Division 5’s deployment date (the first deployment date
in the sample). The linear trend variable is the month of the sample. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. Division 6 is absorbed by the
intercept.
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Table A7: The Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residual Residual Residual Residual
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam 0.1001* 0.1022* 0.1004* 0.1025*
(0.0592) (0.0584) (0.0593) (0.0584)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post Michael Brown Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grand Jury Decision FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.1218 0.1253 0.1223 0.1258
N 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the full-sample residual of Arresti,j,t from the regression reported in Table A6.
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Table A8: Body-Worn Cameras and Racial Disparities in Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate: Be-
fore March 11, 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
BodyCam× BHi 0.0628 0.0735 0.0433 0.0598
(0.0707) (0.0704) (0.0691) (0.0665)
BodyCam 0.1288** 0.1272** 0.1367** 0.1326**
(0.0602) (0.0578) (0.0604) (0.0579)
BHi -0.0808*** -0.0820*** -0.0950*** -0.0971***
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0295) (0.0297)
(BodyCam× BHi) + BHi -0.0179 -0.0085 -0.0517 -0.0373
(0.0697) (0.0700) (0.0749) (0.0726)
LMPD Division FE Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE× BHi N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.1413 0.1495 0.1426 0.1509
N 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation, prior to division
6’s deployment date. Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported
in parentheses. BHi equals 1 if the stopped motorist is black or Hispanic, and 0 otherwise. Each
column reports three regression coefficient followed by their standard errors. Then, the sum of the
column’s coefficients on BodyCam × BHi and BHi are reported followed by the standard error for
the combination. This estimates the racial disparity in arrest rate following the effect of body cams.
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Table A9: Pretextual-Stop Arrest Rate and Group Trends: Before June 1, 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t Arresti,j,t
Trend× BHi 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Trend -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0081 -0.0046
(0.0010) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0457) (0.0459)
LMPD Division FE N Y Y Y Y
Week-of-Sample FE N Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N N Y N Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE× BHi N N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE× BHi N N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE× BHi N N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE× BHi N N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2012 FE N N N Y Y
Post Sept. 2013 FE N N N Y Y
Post M.B. Shooting FE N N N Y Y
Post Grd. Jury FE N N N Y Y
R-squared 0.0012 0.1320 0.1320 0.1333 0.1414
N 3,369 3,369 3,369 3,369 3,369
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from stops where failure-to-signal was the only cited traffic violation, prior to division
5’s deployment date. Robust standard errors, clustered at the division-by-year level, are reported
in parentheses. BHi equals 1 if the stopped motorist is black or Hispanic, and 0 otherwise. Each
column reports three regression coefficients followed by their standard errors. Then, the sum of
the column’s coefficients on BodyCam× BHi and BHi are reported followed by the standard error
for the combination. This estimates the racial disparity in arrest rate following the effect of body
cams.
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